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Public communication for the common good?  
On the is-ought distinction in the media and  
communications field 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
The quality of our news diet, the polarizing effects of political communication, or the way 
digital, social and mobile media are transforming public communications have long been 
matters of concern. Studies in media and communications have concluding, among other 
things, that public communication is in crisis (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995), that the public 
sphere is becoming trivial, ineffective, or afflicted by fragmentation (Keane 1995). Social 
erosion theories linked news coverage to cynicism, alienation and declining trust in political 
institutions (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; R. Putnam 2000), while evidence suggests that 
partisan media can polarize audiences (Levendusky 2013). More recently the mainstreaming 
of digital, social and mobile media fueled hopes for a participatory democratic renewal. But 
the same technologies can also augment inequalities in political knowledge, while the 
amount of biased and misinformation appears to be on the rise in increasingly fragmented 
and polarized online information spheres (Papacharissi 2002; Aelst et al. 2017). Some argue 
that making public communication more deliberative can counteract pernicious trends. As 
with most social sciences, media and communication research has always straddled the in-
tersection between normative and empirical inquiry. 
The study of media and communications is often suffused with ideals, pervaded with ap-
praisals of what is good and bad with media and communication, and assertions about the 
normative relevance of its findings. Yet the normative commitments that motivate research, 
and the premises from which research questions take their cue, often go unstated, let alone 
enjoying detailed justifications (Althaus 2011). Values, and the normative standards they 
inform, often lurk in the background, implied and under specified (Bucy and D’Angelo 2004). 
When social research aims to be value- free, seeking ‘the truth’ irrespective of its normative 
implications, it usually still has normative implications. Furthermore, concepts such as pub-
lic sphere, political knowledge, deliberation and participation, are often applied without 
sufficient clarity about whether the analytical task is evaluation or explanation, thus con-
founding is with ought (Gerhards and Neidhardt 1993). Often it remains unclear what justi-
fies different norms of public communication that motivate research and serve as standards 
of appraisal, or how these norms relate to one another. In part this is the result of a persis-
tent gap between those engaged in normative enquiry and those engaged in empirical social 
research, which is often so wide that fruitful opportunities for mutual engagement are over-
looked (Thompson 2008). 
Though Rawls excluded media and communications from his demands for public reason, this 
increasingly looks like an omission for anyone concerned with the contemporary exercise of 
public reason (Fox 2013). Work on deliberative democracy aside, relatively little serious 
critical attention has been focused on the wider norms of media and public communication, 
the justification of these norms, and how norms may need to adapt in response to new 
communication technological, or wider social and political changes. While political theory 
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provides a wellspring of systematic engagement with the norms that inform the study of 
politics, the media and communications field has not developed an equivalently substantive 
engagement with its normative underpinnings (Hänska 2019). 
This invites a broader and more structured discussion about how we should communicate, 
and what role media should play. At the same time we must avoid the kind of gymnastics in 
moral space that never hit the ground. We do not need to agree a comprehensive account 
of what perfect public communication should look like before we can proceed to study and 
evaluate media and communications. But we do need to be clear about the justifications 
that undergird different norms and aims of public communication, how different norms and 
aims compete with each other, what the trade-offs between them are, and how they relate 
to empirical research, how facts and norms inform one another. 
This paper aims to move towards a more productive, critical framework for relating norma-
tive ideals of public communication to empirical research. It delineates a non- dichotomous 
distinction between the facts and norms of public communication by showing where efforts 
to avoid substantive normative commitments fail, how empirical results can inform norma-
tive enquiry, and how empirical research can gain greater clarity and coherence about its 
normative underpinnings. It does not advance a particular normative view on public com-
munication. Instead it offers an exposition of how thinking about the relationship between 
facts and norms can be productive. While we should avoid the dichotomous view that one 
can speak either about what is, or about what ought to be, there is much to be gained from 
greater clarity on when concepts are used empirically, and when normatively.  
The first section argues that pluralism poses the central normative problem to which public 
communication proposes a partial, empirical-procedural, solution. Conceptualizing public 
communication as processes of choice formation also helps to sharpen our thinking about 
how norms apply to communication contents, processes, its effects, and the causal rela-
tionship between them. Section two delineates the normative-empirical distinction through 
a non-exhaustive illustratively review of relevant empirical and normative literature. To 
make the distinction analytically tangible, section three distinguishes normative and empir-
ical claims in methodological and epistemic terms, highlighting their non-rival nature. It 
ends by outlining key intersections between normative and empirical enquiry, around which 
mutually productive engagement can most easily emerge. 
 
2 Public Communication as Processes of Collective Choice Formation 
Public, political communication mediates political processes, by conveying information be-
tween centers of political power and ‘the people,’ by publicizing the functioning of the 
political system, and thematizing troubles or issues afflicting people, by giving voice, host-
ing and facilitating debate. Political communication research focuses on these processes by 
which information flows between the political system and the citizenry, how that infor-
mation represents different issues (its content), and what effects that information can have 
on political behavior and the political system. Others adopt a more citizen-centered focus, 
examining the role of media in civic participation and engagement, or how it facilitates 
(deliberative) discourse. 
But public communication is not merely an intervening factor in social or political processes, 
but central to them, and important for explaining their consequences. Public 
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communication is key to understanding how collective choices come about, how popular 
assent, dissent, or reluctant acquiescence of political power emerges. Of course, the key 
mechanisms of collective choice are legally established procedures leading to specific deci-
sions over choice sets, for instance in an election, referendum, town hall meeting, or par-
liamentary vote. Public communication designates the attendant (and usually diffuse) com-
municative processes which, while not mechanistic in producing a definite choice (like a 
vote), are crucial for furnishing collective choice situations with information, relevant ar-
guments and judgements, and a set of values, interests or attitudes. These furnishings are 
consequential both in defining the choice set (disposable options) and in shaping, what are 
sometime referred to as, meta-agreements (a shared representational framework for con-
ceptualizing and deciding an issue (List 2002)). They constitute the political information 
environments on which citizens depend for political knowledge. Debate, deliberation, opin-
ion polls, private conversations, and news reporting can inform how choices are framed, 
and define disposable options. But misinformation, propaganda, trolling and harassment, 
denial of voice, and exclusion from public debate, echo chambers, or spirals of silence can 
play a similarly consequential role in cajoling acquiesce. Falsifications, ad hominems, spin, 
false-equivalences, mis- and dis- information can produce assent to the exercise of power 
where it would otherwise be withheld. Such diffuse communicative processes do not actu-
ally ‘decide’ but are crucial in shaping the context within which collective choices arise, 
making some decisions seem more justified, appropriate, feasible, or expedient. 
It is the role of public communication in shaping collective choices from which its normative 
significance derives, because while it creates new risks, it also affords an opportunity to 
bridle power in the service of the common good.1 By emphasizing communication’s role in 
advocacy and the critique of power, scholars underscore the value of giving voice to the 
powerless. When research emphasizes its role in facilitating debate and deliberation, it 
points to the value of formulating rational and inclusive collective choices, to the im-
portance of informed consent for a program of government. Scholarship that stresses the 
importance of journalism in providing reliable, accurate information and creating transpar-
ency, elevates the value of information quality, truth and accountability. Theories of the 
public sphere often emphasize the importance of the demos partaking in a common dis-
course, the same informational environment (something that echo chambers and partisan 
media are seen to put at risk). The underlying assertion is that it is good and desirable to 
organize processes of public communication according to these democratic norms. Norma-
tive theories of public communication guide, stipulate, oblige and command how we ought 
to communicate. But what exactly are norms of public communication supposed to be good 
for? The implied answer is that they are not only good for you, or me, but that when media 
and communication are structured in accordance with these norms, they will be conducive 
to our shared, collective good, and that we therefore all have reasons to value them. 
 
Empirical Answers to Normative Questions 
However, most societies are pluralistic, characterized by a variety of interests, ways of life, 
and points of view. Thus, if public communication is to be conducive to the common good—
                                               
1 Habermas (1992) outlined the socio-historical transformation through which ‘the public’, its will 
ostensibly expressed through public discourse, came to be viewed as the primary source of political 
authority. Thereafter favourable public opinion became essential to the exercise of political power 
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the meaning of which will always be contested under conditions of pluralism—its norms need 
to take account of, indeed be able to accommodate social pluralism.2 Rawls captured this 
challenge of pluralism when he asked how it was “possible for there to exist over time a 
just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by rea-
sonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?” (Rawls 1993, 4) What, if anything, 
constitutes the common good in pluralistic societies? This question surfaces in discussions 
about the proper norms of public communication. Particularly as partisan polarization ap-
pears to be on the rise, accommodating pluralism remains a (if not the) central normative 
problem bedeviling democracy, and a key task norms of public communication need to ad-
dress. 
The ostensible value of well-structured public communication, and the democratic choice 
processes it is supposed to support, is that its provisions for the common good are procedural 
(information, debate, voice), rather than substantive, making it easier for different groups 
to accept its basic requirements. The normative problem of accommodating the various 
views, interests and preferences of pluralistic society gains an empirical solution, in the 
answer to the question ‘what kind of political arrangements would member of a pluralistic 
society freely choose.’ Essentially the task of defining the common good’s substantive con-
tent is remitted to a collective choice, and all that is left for proceduralism is to specify 
how a collective choice should be approximated. It avoids the usually problematic meta-
physical foundations on which substantive conceptions of the common good rely, as they 
are replaced with empirical-procedural foundations in the form of collective choices (Vin-
cent 2004). This is what Habermas has in mind when he speaks of critical public opinion—an 
extension of the Kantian idea that conflicts should be carried out through discourse. Com-
munication provides an opportunity for living with pluralism: At a minimum it allows for 
conflicts to be ameliorated and power held in check through the articulation of competing 
interests (a view more closely aligned with liberal democrats who emphasize no-domina-
tion). At most political authority gains deep moral authority from collective choices that 
successfully accommodate social differences (a view more closely aligned with radical dem-
ocrats who emphasize the self-determination of the demos). Of course well-structured pub-
lic communication does not guarantee good and just social arrangements, but under condi-
tions of pluralism it is essential to their pursuit (Dryzek 2013). 
 
Slippage towards Normativity 
The value of a procedural definition of the common good, that specifies how communication 
should support collective choice formation, is an empirical answer to a normative question. 
As I hope will become clear, a procedural approach to public communication also has the 
meta-conceptual benefits of shedding light on the relationship between facts and norms of 
communication. What, then, does such a procedural definition require? It must specify con-
straints, procedural guidelines, and/or aims for public communication. In the first instance, 
it must specify constraints to define the proper domain (democracy’s domain), and scope 
of public communication, while avoiding substantive normative commitments that would 
make it difficult to accommodate the value pluralism of heterogeneous societies—it must 
remain recognizably just from a plurality of points of view. Yet, as I will show, purely 
                                               
2 By common good I have in mind questions about the rightness of political arrangements, the moral 
order of society. How would society be organised to be as it morally ought to be (Michelman 1997). 
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procedural definitions fail, because procedural norms cannot be sustained without some 
understanding of their substantive aims, that is, without some understanding of the common 
good they are supposed to help us obtain. Procedural conceptions of public communication 
necessarily involve some slippage towards substantive normative commitments. 
Let us consider two illustrations of this problem. First, we face democracy’s boundary prob-
lem, the compositional question of specifying democracy’s domain. We need to determine 
who are members of the demos; without such a compositional criterion that tells us who 
bears democratic rights, the common good could not take shape. A purely empirical, thus 
strictly descriptive account of the public sphere may tell us that those with access to power, 
or those who command online bot armies, can make themselves heard above everyone else. 
However, in order for public communication to justify the exercise of power in terms of the 
common good, we need to determine who ought to have a voice. We require, in the first 
instance, an independent (i.e. antecedent) definition of who composes the public—a poll-
ster, for instance, requires a sampling frame. 
Consider another illustration. Imagine a town hall meeting with two subgroups, S1 and S2, 
each arriving at two concomitant but incommensurable choices C1 (agreeable to all in S1) 
and C2 (agreeable to all in S2). Empirically the choice may be settled if either S1 or S2 has 
the power to impose its will on the other. However, the only way of justifying a choice 
between C1 and C2 in terms of the common good, is to do so independently of the beliefs, 
values and preferences of S1 and S2 that support C1 and C2. Members of S1 and S2 must 
already share in common some principles to help resolve the impasse and accommodate 
conflicting points of view—an antecedent understanding of what it means for a choice to be 
good. Such a principle may, for instance, specify the scope of collective choice (i.e. what 
is a public and what a private issue, what the demos deems itself fit to decide), or distin-
guish relevant from irrelevant contributions (e.g. reasoned argument and truthful infor-
mation from rhetoric, misinformation and ad hominems). Such a principle can help to re-
solve such an impasse by determining how different arguments, preferences, beliefs or val-
ues are to be ranked or prioritized—for example, a pollster needs to decide which questions 
to ask and how to aggregate responses. A journalist needs to decide what information has 
greater news value, and greater credence, and Facebook must decide how to avoid becom-
ing a conduit for falsehoods. The debate between agonistic and deliberative approaches 
turns on such questions about the scope of democratic choice, and choice- relevant consid-
erations. 
The idea of a purely procedural, norm-free, definition of the common good is at least par-
tially self-defeating. For public communication to be conducive to the common good under 
conditions of pluralism, some guiding norms, established independently from public com-
munication, are a requirement. Norms which tell us how media should be structured, and 
how communication ought to function, by specifying who may participate, what falls within 
democracy’s purview, and which considerations are choice-relevant (see Figure 1). These 
amount to an understanding of public communication’s substantive aims. Logic demands 
that if such norms are to guide public communication, they must necessarily be antecedent. 
And if they are to serve as standards to evaluate the health of public communication, they 
must be independent. This makes the stipulation of such principles a normative task. 
By demonstrating the need for process independent norms to be in place prior to any act of 
communication, a procedural conception brings the relationship between the facts and 
norms of public communication into focus. It demonstrates how ideals and practices of 
— „Communicative Figurations“| Working Paper | No. 26 (2019) — 
 
8 of 25 
public communication are interrelated, allowing us to conceptualize the fact-value rela-
tionship as one of slippage rather than duality. After all, there is no deep dichotomy be-
tween what is and what ought to be—norms are ultimately concerned with guiding practices, 
and practices are always permeated with values (H. Putnam 2002). Normative slippage re-
fers to this difficulty proceduralism faces in its aim of remitting substantive questions about 
the common good to communicatively facilitated collective choices free of antecedent 
moral commitments. It denotes the observation that a purely empirical definition of the 
common good fails, because some substantive aims are desiderata of any normative con-
ception of public communication. To take this slippage on board requires media and com-
munication research to self-consciously adopt a double, normative-empirical, focus. 
 
3  The Is and Ought of Public Communication 
Conceptualizing public communication as a process allows us to make analytical distinctions 
between its sequenced steps. This sharpens our thinking about the relationship between the 
is and ought of public communication, and helps clarify where and why normative slippage 
occurs (see Figure 1). A procedural framework also provides a useful way of categorizing 
and interpreting relevant phenomena. Normative provisions about input, process and out-
come map quite neatly onto media and communication research’s familiar foci of produc-
tion/communicative practice, text/technology, and reception (e.g. data points about par-
ticipation, content, framing, and effects). Viewing social phenomena though a processual 
optic also bring questions about the dynamics of choice formation—the (causal) relationship 
between input-process-outcome—into focus (e.g. does deliberative public communication 
produce better collective choices, or partisan media polarize public opinion). Focusing on 
different stages of choice processes, this section delineates the normative-empirical dis-
tinction through a non-exhaustive illustrative review of relevant research—note the numbers 
in the review correspond to numbers in the figure and table. While Figure 1 illustrates public 
communication conceived as choice process, Table 1 sets out the relationships between 
procedural norms and substantive aims. 
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Figure 1: Normative and empirical approaches to public communication as processes of 
collective choice formation. Horizontal arrows (⇄) indicate causal powers. 
 
 
Table 1: Normative constraints, guidelines, and aims of public communication, and their 
possible relationships. 
 
Input 
The input side of public communication raises a range of empirical questions, and the nor-
mative need for constraints that communication should satisfy. First, who participates and 
gains voice in shaping collective choices, and who ought to participate (compositional ques-
tions about democracy’s domain). Second, which issues does the demos see itself fit to 
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decide, and what ought to count as a public issue (the scope of collective choice). And, 
third, which contents carry the day (e.g. spin, falsifications, ad hominems) and which con-
tributions ought to be cognitively germane to collective choice (e.g. reasons, preferences, 
attitudes, emotions). 
1) Democracy’s domain refers to the composition of the demos. Which views and interests 
receive a hearing, and are the right people being heard. After all, the normative force of 
public communication rests on the assumption that all those who should be heard, have 
gained voice. Empirically it concerns the ways and means through which people or groups 
gain voice, shape public discourse, or even assert dominance to position themselves as the 
‘true’ voice of the people (drowning out others). Here we confront democracy’s boundary 
question about the composition of the demos, about participation and inclusion in, and 
exclusion from public discourse (Downing 2000). Studies on diversity and bias in the media 
paint a compelling picture of whose voices are heard and represented—for instance on the 
widespread under- representation of women in news and public discourse (Macharia et al. 
2015). Survey research helps understand how and why people come to participate in civic 
life (Verba et al. 1995), and how participation is being reshaped by digital, social and mobile 
communication technologies (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012). Transnational migration, diasporic 
communities, and transnational media challenge assumptions of nationally bounded public 
spheres, on which much media and communication research rests (Chalaby 2005). While 
mass media was mostly co-extensive with nation-states, online and social media are more 
unbounded in their geographic scope (do all those social media accounts sharing campaign 
material belong to citizens?). Indeed globalization, cross-border policy externalities and the 
mobilization of opinions across borders challenge the assumption of neatly compartmental-
ized democratic domains (Fraser 2007; Castells 2008). 
Furthermore, ritual approaches to communication offer a useful empirical framework for 
understanding the role of public communication in producing (and reproducing) the mutual 
identification and fellowship that lend the demos its internal cohesion—so that public com-
munication may be crucial to generating the demos it claims to represent (Carey 2008). 
Anderson (1991) famously observed that the (literary) public sphere and new processes of 
societal communication it involved, was crucial to the emergence of large-scale identity 
forming discourses that gave rise to nationalism. We may assume demoi as given, and stip-
ulate them as the cause of public communication; after all, it is Americans that furiously 
debate their election. However, sociologically we must recognize that input-process-out-
come are non- linear, as questions about who composes the demos are often contested in, 
and settled through public discourse. Indeed, resurgent nativism often turns on the issue of 
exclusion, and re-drawing the demos’ boundary. Consider how Trump demarcates ‘the real 
people’ from others, or how Putin redefines Crimean identity. But by the same token the 
kind of transnational communications discussed in the previous paragraph may well be giving 
rise to new collectivities (Hänska, 2018). 
Notwithstanding such sociological observations, democracy’s boundary problem also raises 
important normative questions about how to constrain membership, who should participate 
in shaping collective choices, and who should be excluded. As Miller (2009) outlines, one 
view on the composition of the demos which, like this essay, assumes pluralism, sees non-
domination as democracy’s central aim. Democracy is valued for its outcome, which is de-
fined by the relationship between those making a decision, and those it affects (its impact 
group). To ensure democracy does not result in domination the demos should include those 
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affected by its choices. Pluralism is celebrated, because it guards against the dominance by 
any one group. Here public communication demands that those affected by a choice should 
have a voice in its making, that “all possibly affected persons” be included (Habermas 1996, 
107). Democracy’s normative force derives from its requirement for “a ‘symmetrical’ and 
‘congruent’ relationship between political decision-makers and the recipients of political 
decisions” (Held 2006, 209). This view prioritizes inclusion in the demos, over its internal 
coherence. 
Alternatively, we can prioritizes coherence of the demos over inclusiveness (Miller 2009). 
Here democracy is valued intrinsically because it enables collective self determination, and 
not primarily because its outcome avoids domination. But collective self-determination, in 
a thick sense, where one can speak of the demos as sharing a common mind, require a 
degree of internal cohesion, sympathetic mutual identification, mutual trust, and shared 
ethical outlook amongst its members. Members must identify sufficiently with the group in 
order to want to accommodate each other’s interests. Questions of impact and inclusion 
are secondary to the stability and internal cohesion of the demos. Consequently, this view 
emphasizes the necessity of exclusion to guards against expansion of the demos through 
ever wider inclusion, and avoid excessive internal pluralism which would erode the cohesion 
which is required for a group to function like a demos. 
2) Scope refers to the range of issues a demos see itself fit to debate, pronounce upon, and 
decide. Which issues fall within public communication’s purview? Agenda setting and fram-
ing are two key models of media effects that help understand how public communication 
shapes democracy’s de facto scope. The way an issue is framed can both curtail and expand 
public discussion of it, and thus set the public policy agenda (Reese et al. 2001). Violence 
against women and reproductive rights, for instance, are issues elevated into public debate 
(or kept off the agenda) through skilled framing (Joachim 2003). Or consider how GDP came 
to dominate talk about public welfare, while questions of subjective wellbeing or happiness 
are not deemed pertinent (Johal et al. 2014). The distinction between hard and soft news 
is perhaps the most familiar discursive delineation of public communication’s scope: Hard 
news is usually presented as being of broad socio-political relevance and is typically re-
ported in an dispassionate, depersonalized style, while soft news is usually presented as 
pertaining to private matters, lacking wider socio-political relevance, and is often reported 
through more personalized, emotional stories (Reinemann et al. 2012). Public communica-
tion can shape both what the demos considers an issue it should discuss and decide, and 
what lies beyond its remit. 
Delineating public communication’s scope (or remit) inevitably also involves the question 
which issues we have good reasons to decide collectively, entailing the normative task of 
stipulating constraints that distinguish public interests from private matters. Yet, as femi-
nist and other critical scholars have persuasively argued, there is no morally neutral bound-
ary between public and private (Young 1985). The ability to define this boundary and set 
the scope of public interest, what we should collectively know about, talk about, and decide 
is an important source of power, and a key mechanisms through which prevailing power 
relations are reproduced by excluding alterity. 
3) Relevance: Closely related questions arise about which considerations, arguments, or 
views ought to be germane to collective choice, and should consequently be maximized in 
public communication, and which ones turn out to be actually decisive (ad hominems or 
evidence based argumentation)? Normative views hold, for instance, that preferences, 
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interests or reasons that are in some kind of deliberative equilibrium (e.g. which are reflec-
tive, rational, and stable in the sense that re-framing the issue will not change them) are 
more worthy of consideration than non-deliberative ones. The same is often implicitly as-
serted about views that are well informed; consider the expert interview, or scientific facts, 
for example (Jønch-Clausen and Kappel 2016). The aim of public communication should then 
be to increase political knowledge, or ensure that our preferences are fully considered. Such 
views often discount emotion, for instance, as a valid contribution to public communication, 
but also raise questions about the extent to which political ignorance can be remediated 
(Kaye 2015). 
Such normative constraints should be viewed alongside empirical findings, on the increasing 
centrality of emotions in journalism and wider public communication (Wahl-Jorgensen 
2013), or the importance of private conversations to political discourse (Livingstone and 
Lunt 1993). Consider the ‘protest paradigm’, which anticipates that civic protests tend to 
be frame negatively in the news, discounting their value as expressions of public interest 
(Chan and Lee 1984). Furthermore, assumptions that individual preferences are stable and 
rational, allowing research to treat them as settled and exogenous, are contradicted by 
findings on a whole range of biases (e.g. framing effects) that make individual preferences 
‘predictably irrational’ (Ariely 2008; Achen and Bartels 2016). Given such results, what is, 
and what should be relevant to collective choice (see 5, below)? 
 
Process 
Processes of public communication, and their effects, are at the heart of what we are con-
cerned with here. Practices of communication, their technologies and facilitating institu-
tions raise questions about how communication is structured, and to what end (e.g. to per-
suade, inform, or entertain). Also, do these processes and practices of communication have 
the causal power to produce certain (desirable) effects? Attendant normative questions 
arise about whether we value well-structured public communication as an end in itself, and 
if so what it should look like (e.g. fair, affording equal opportunity to speak, facilitating 
inclusive debate). Or whether communication is valued merely as a means to an end, and if 
so, which ends it should help realize (e.g. increased political knowledge, or consensus), and 
thus which procedural guidelines public communication ought to follow. 
4) Process-centered approaches treat communicative processes and practice as interesting 
objects of enquiry in their own right, rather than mere transmission or causal mechanisms 
mediating between objects of actual interest. Consider evaluative research, which ap-
praises the quality of public communications in a range of choice situations, and the media 
systems that support them. For example many studies have evaluated the deliberative qual-
ity of communications in online discussion forums, town hall meetings or parliaments (Mans-
bridge 1976; Dahlberg 2004; Steiner et al. 2005). Similarly, comparative studies on the de-
sign of media systems offer an appraisal of their quality (Norris 2004). 
The political economy tradition of media and communication research is also relevant, as it 
can shed light on the way communication power is exercised processualy and structurally 
(Mansell 2004). Consider social media platforms, whose business depends on growing and 
maintaining the attention of their user base, and therefore optimize for user engagement, 
not for quality of discourse. Consequently platforms’ structural affordances will favor the 
lurid and funny over the weighty and important, compelling the latter to mimic the former 
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if it is to receive a wider hearing. Or consider research on the socio-cultural factors influ-
encing citizen participation in the public sphere, which offers clues on how to structure 
more inclusive public communicaiton (Dahlgren 2006). Mutz (2006) famously observed that 
increased participation may be inversley related to cross-cutting engagement. Furthermore, 
burgeoining scholarship helps us understand how online and mobile media are (re-) shaping 
participatory public communication. For instance, it appears that seeking political infor-
mation via social media sites is a good predictor of peoples’ social capital, civic and political 
participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012), or that internet access was a good predictor of 
early participation in protests on Egypt’s Tahrir square during the Arab Spring (Tufekci and 
Wilson 2012). 
Normatively an interesting set of questions arise about whether public communication has 
intrinsic value (whether it is itself constitutive of the common good), and not merely instru-
mental to achieving a good collective choice (see 5 and 6 below). In this view, procedural 
fairness and inclusiveness are non-derivative goods, in the sense that they are valued for 
their own sake and not because they help produce an eventual just outcome. Participation-
ists, for instance, believe that there are strong independent (non-derivative) reasons to 
value participation, because a just society is one in which citizens can regularly and actively 
participate in shaping public policy (cf. some view participation as a means to achieving 
correct choices, rather than a good in itself, as will be clarified in 5 and 6). Thus, public 
communication should maximize inclusion, participation and equality (or minimize exclu-
sion), because giving people fair and equal opportunities to participate and be heard are 
independent moral goods (Sen 2009; Couldry 2010). Consider also agonistic approaches, 
which argue that deliberative democracy puts participation in the service of reaching a 
consensus (see 6), effectively sanitizing politics by suppressing conflict and excluding those 
views that do not fit narrow consensus-oriented constraints (Mouffe 1999). For agonists the 
goal is not an endpoint (e.g. consensus), but the process of transforming antagonistic con-
flict into agonistic pluralism, a process that minimizes exclusion. 
5) Input-oriented: An alternative normative view on processes of public communication 
values them as a means to improving the quality of inputs (political knowledge or prefer-
ences). In this view collective choices are aggregations of individual preferences, and public 
communication is a means for improving these preferences (cf. collective choice as discur-
sively achieved consensus or ‘common mind.’ See 6). To ensure citizens are well informed 
news media ought to provide high quality, diverse political information (Nielsen 2017), em-
powering them to hold authority to account (Schudson 1995). Aiming to improve inputs, 
some deliberative theories, challenging the assumption that individual preferences are ex-
ogenously given, argue that deliberation improves individual preferences, making them 
more rational, considered and robust (Gutmann and Thompson 2009). As noted (see 3), 
preferences or views that are in ‘deliberative equilibrium’ are sometimes considered more 
germane to collective choices. Here public communication is supposed to support the polit-
ical system by elevating political knowledge, and supporting individual preferences for-
mation. 
The implied causal power ascribed to public communication in realizing particular input-
side benefits lends itself to empirical investigation. For instance, media effects research 
has explored the ability of news media to improve citizen’s political knowledge. Experi-
mental studies have asked whether deliberation can improve participants’ understanding of 
an issue (Min, 2007), or make their preferences more stable by mitigating framing effects 
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(the tendency to change ones preference depending on how an issue is framed) (Druckman 
2004). Important empirical questions have also been raised about the effects of news on 
political knowledge, on voter preferences, or whether online news increases or diminishes 
selective exposure to news sources (Iyengar and Simon 1993; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 
2006). 
6) Outcome-oriented: Related research focuses on the effects of public communication on 
outcomes. For instance, whether deliberation narrows disagreement (Wojcieszak 2011), or 
improves participants’ subjective political efficacy (Min 2007). News media, on the other 
hand, can also increase partisan polarization (Levendusky 2013), making consensus less 
likely. Similarly dysfunctional public communication can produce ‘spirals of silence’, as one 
opinion becomes dominant while those who perceiver themselves to hold a minority view 
remain silent to avoid isolation (Noelle-Neumann 1974)—sometimes referred to as pluralistic 
ignorance. The prevalence of strategic uses of communication (propaganda, advertising or 
PR) to influence or control public communication should not be overlooked either 
(Holtzhausen 2008). 
Much of this research rests on the belief that well-structured public communications has 
the causal power to help obtain better, or worse, choices. The underlying normative views 
are teleological, considering public communication a means to achieving desired aims, for 
producing better collective choices (what exactly a better choice may consist in will be 
discussed in 7 and 8). Here the value of the process derives from its ability to reach some 
ideal endpoint. Specific ends-oriented procedural guidelines may draw inspiration from 
Rawls’ (Rawls 1971) ‘original position’ and the reflective equilibrium or Habermas’ (Haber-
mas 1999) ideal speech situation and his notion of discourse ethics (though neither are in-
tended to be fully realized in practice, rather serving as regulative ideals). Here the value 
of public communication derives from its ability to obtain better choices (e.g. true, just or 
legitimate ones).  
 
Outcome 
Directly or implicitly, media and communication research is concerned with communica-
tions’ impact on political outcomes. How it affects public opinions or elections, for instance. 
And attendant normative question about the ends public communication ought to serve: 
should it help us achieve collective choices that are more correct or legitimate, for exam-
ple? Here we are also confronted with communication’s causal power to produce particular 
(desired) outcomes (e.g. narrowing disagreement, see 6). Broadly speaking there are two 
normative views on the aims of public communication. 
7) Correct outcomes: One important view argues that public communication should help us 
make choices that are better from some objective point of view. For example, some epis-
temic democrats holds that deliberation is good because it tends to produce the right or 
correct choice (Bohman 2007; Estlund 2008). Here public communication is viewed instru-
mentally, in the sense that its value is not intrinsic, but derived from its ability to help 
obtain correct or just outcomes. Two challenges in particular confront epistemic ap-
proaches. Firstly, they require a process-independent definition of correctness by which the 
quality of a choice can be appraised (Estlund 1997; Michelman 1997). Such definitions nec-
essarily involve slippage towards substantive conceptions of the common good, because the 
formal aim of achieving ‘correct’ or ‘just’ outcomes remains unworkable absent some notion 
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of the substantive shape that a correct or just outcome would take—a problem procedural-
ism is supposed to avoid. Secondly, because in this view public communication’s value is 
derivative, procedural features such as participation and inclusion, that are usually consid-
ered vital, can in principle be jettisoned for more effective means of achieving correct 
outcomes—wise and benevolent technocrats, or a franchise restricted to politically knowl-
edgeable citizens, may more reliably reach the right decision, after all (Brennan 2016). So 
why not an epistocracy? 
8) Legitimate outcomes: A contrasting normative view emphasizes the legitimacy of out-
comes (endogenously or relatively defined) as aim and end of public communication. Legit-
imacy of outcomes may be defined as consensus or subjective ex post (facto) acceptance 
by participants. Public communication, in this view, ought to produce agreement, or at 
least narrow disagreement (Dryzek 2005). By defining the desired outcome endogenously 
(or relatively) such approaches cleverly sidestep the need for process-independent stand-
ards, thus avoiding more pronounced normative slippage faced by epistemic approaches 
(see 7). 
Input, process and output of collective choice processes are of course linked, but the dis-
tinction has analytical value. It brings the relationships between different aspects of com-
municative processes into focus. The distinction also helps to understand trade-offs and 
incommensurabilities between different norms of public communication (see Table 1). For 
example, the contrast between process- (means) and outcome- (ends) oriented approaches 
is potentially problematic (Estlund 1997), because it raises the fundamental question 
whether a choice is good because it was arrived at through the right procedure or because 
it is correct by some process- independent standard. Means-oriented approach that empha-
size inclusiveness can be seen to endorse a kind procedural ethics (something is good be-
cause it was achieved through the right process). In contrast, end-oriented approaches that 
emphasize legitimacy can be seen to endorse a kind of autonomy of ethics (something is 
good because people agree on it), while those who emphasize correct outcomes can be seen 
to endorse a kind of ethical naturalism (something is good independently of what parties to 
the choice think about it, or how it was arrived at). We can value online communication 
because it allows everyone to participate in the production and diffusion of public discourse, 
or loath it because this same discourse has become unmoored from traditional information 
intermediaries responsible for quality control. We can value public communication as a 
means, as an end, or maybe a bit of both. 
Prima facie different approaches to public communication may appear to be similar, yet 
closer inspection reveals important trade-offs and incommensurabilities between different 
normative constraints, procedural stipulations, and aims. There are good reasons to value 
inclusiveness and participation, but neither is necessary for obtaining correct outcomes. 
There are also good reasons to value some objective standard of correctness, but the ob-
jectively best choice may not suffice to achieve subjective legitimacy. If we aim to increase 
political knowledge on an issue such as climate change, for instance, then expounding sta-
tistical evidence may not be the best strategy; even if it satisfies some important constraint 
or guideline on rationality and veracity. It is valuable for empirical communication research 
be clear about the kind of normative ideal it endorses, and whether this ideal pertains to 
some constraint, procedural feature, or aim of public communication, because different 
constraints, guidelines and aims make competing, and possibly incommensurable demands. 
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Methodological and Epistemic Pluralism 
Media and communication research is not a methodologically integrated field with a shared 
meta-conceptual outlook. It is permeated by values related to, but distinct from empirical 
arguments. For the distinction between normative and the empirical conceptions of public 
communication to become analytically fecund, it cannot be grasped in terms of content 
alone, it must be understood in methodological and epistemic terms. 
What is Normativity? 
‘An informed citizenry, inclusive processes of public communication, and correct or legiti-
mate outcomes’ are answers to the question ‘what do we have reasons to value’, and what 
do we thus have reasons to do. In this sense normative conceptions of public communication 
do not represent accounts of how the (mind-independent) world is believed to be, as em-
pirical accounts do. Rather they represent beliefs about how the world ought to be, how 
public communication ought to be structured and conducted. Sometimes normative repre-
sentations are referred to as having a ‘world-to-fit-mind’ direction of fit, to borrow a notion 
from the philosophy of mind (Humberstone 1992). They are intentional attitudes that give 
expression to a desire about how the world should be. They guide, recommend, motivate 
and oblige our communicative behavior with the aim of changing the world to fit normative 
ideals—and thus must be antecedent to communication (hence the problem of slippage is 
also temporal). 
Normative approaches to communication ask how it ought to function in order to be condu-
cive to the common good—in order to function as it should. This involves stipulating public 
communication’s constraints, procedural guidelines, and/or aims, and attendant conditions 
of adequacy that inputs, processes, and/or outputs, should satisfy. These stipulations are 
said to be worthy of endorsement either because they are constitutive of goodness (e.g. 
participation as an end in itself), because they are conducive to goodness (e.g. deliberation 
as a means to correctness), or in terms of avoiding ‘other-than-good-things’ (e.g. minimize 
exclusion, irrationality or harm). In this sense ideals of public communication are not con-
cerned with substantive ethical questions about the common good (e.g. should we build 
more schools) but with meta- ethical question (e.g. what does it means for something to be 
constitutive of, or conducive to the common good). 
Normative methods are the steps taken to answer such counterfactual questions. Because 
public communication is supposed to provide an empirical procedural answer to normatively 
substantive questions about the common good under conditions of pluralism, sophisticated 
normative theories must try to avoid slippage towards substantive norms. The most promi-
nent method of doing so is probably Rawls’s ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971). An idealized 
thought experiment, the reflective equilibrium refers to the end point of a deliberative 
process (a deliberative equilibrium) in which reasoners work back and forth through a set 
of consideration and moral intuitions. To avoid slippage the reflective equilibrium needs to 
be ‘free standing’ (in Rawls’s terms), independent of any antecedent moral commitments. 
The justification for using this method to stipulate standards of adequacy for public com-
munication must thus “itself derive from the reflective equilibrium that it helps us achieve” 
(Daniels 2014 Winter 2013 Edition: , section 2.2., para. 3). The normative force of public 
communication depends on its ability to be self-supporting. 
Habermasian principles of deliberative communication derive from his conception of an 
ideal speech situation (where everyone is equally able to speak, social differences are 
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bracketed, and the force of the better argument has supremacy). These principles gain 
foundations through his method of rational reconstruction (Habermas 1987). He argues that 
validity claims (i.e. truth, appropriateness, sincerity) and an orientation towards ‘under-
standing’ as the ends of speech are part of the invariant structures of human communication 
(i.e. validity claims are pre-theoretical, universally implicit in all language use): “[I]f the 
aim of a speech act is to be understood and really communicate, then, it follows, for Ha-
bermas, that validity claims are presupposed implicitly” (Vincent 2004, 286). The ideal 
speech situation, he argues, provides the conditions for realizing this telos of human com-
munication. Unlike Rawls, the conditions of ideal speech are not entirely ideal, but can and 
should inform deliberative communication. In short, normative methods present attempts 
to provide normative principles with self-supporting foundations, that avoid drawing support 
from substantive normative commitments and metaphysical arguments. 
In contrast empirical accounts of public communication aim to represent the world, or more 
specifically the role of communication in shaping collective choices, as it is believed to be. 
Empirical concepts have a mind-to-fit-world direction of fit—they aim to get representations 
(e.g. concepts and theories) to describe or explain actual processes of public communica-
tion. They answer questions about the functioning of choice processes by describing de facto 
choices, underlying individual attitudes, and seeking to understand the various causal mech-
anisms that shape collective choices. The methods of empirical enquiry provide the tools 
that make phenomena observable, and are more widely thematized and systematically de-
veloped than those of normative enquiry. From content analysis to appraise quality of con-
tents, panel studies that can shed light on choice processes as causal systems, ethnographic 
work on communicative practices, or experimental designs that isolate specific phenomena 
to test hypothesize, I assume empirical methods are familiar to the reader.  
 
4 Normative-Empirical Intersections? 
Normative and empirical accounts offer epistemically and methodologically distinct, but 
non-rival, representations of the world (if de facto choices are largely not deliberative, this 
does not in itself defeat deliberative theories). The former appraises the quality of public 
communication, the latter observes, measures and explains it. A purely empirical account 
of public communication would be descriptive or explanatory. It may tell us that powerful 
media proprietors shape public opinion or “manufacture consent” (Herman and Chomsky 
1994), or that algorithmic filter bubbles feed us information congenial to our attitudes and 
prejudices. We may believe that there is something wrong with referring a choice about the 
common good to a media monopoly or letting it be informed by our prejudices, yet any such 
evaluation requires a clear standards of adequacy—without clear norms and values informing 
media and communication research it will lack critical force. Conversely, a purely normative 
conception that holds, for instance, that collective choices should reflect a deliberatively 
reached rational consensus, will do little to improve the quality of collective choices without 
an empirical account of the social agents involved, the social context within which choices 
are shaped and the specification of some ‘principles of enactment’ (Held 2006). 
This methodological and epistemic pluralism ensues from public communication’s normative 
slippage. But it also illustrates that there is no fundamental dichotomy between empirical 
(factual) and normative (evaluative/action-guiding) approaches to public communication. 
Asking ‘how is public communication conducted, and what influence does it have on 
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collective choices’ and ‘do we have reasons to value these choices, and the way public 
communication is conducted’ are questions about the same world, in the sense that asking 
one of these questions without the other omits something important. Evaluation requires 
description plus standards of appraisal. It seems clear that any comprehensive account of 
public communication must contain both a clear set of guiding norms and values, and an 
empirical understanding of the relationship between communication and collective choice. 
To further advance such comprehensive understandings, the analytical distinction between 
normative and empirical conceptions needs to be fecund. Answering empirical questions 
about public communication will not solve normative problems, but it can help us along the 
way. Reflection on normative questions will not answer, but may help us ask better empir-
ical questions. A more systematic approach to the normative implications of empirical find-
ings, and the empirical questions raised by normative ideals, is called for (Mutz 2006; Peters 
2008; Thompson 2008; Neblo et al. 2010). The notion of direction of fit, introduced earlier, 
offers a productive way of reflecting on the is-ought relationship. In what follows I outline 
two key intersections where normative and empirical questions cut-across one another: How 
do we stipulate norms-appropriate-to-the-world. And, how do we think about getting the 
world to fit stipulated ideals (world-to-fit-mind). These intersections offer conceptually rig-
orous opportunities for aligning normative enquiry and empirical social research so that they 
speak to each other more consistently. 
 
Getting norms-appropriate-to-the-world 
There are several ways in which norms can be appropriate to the world; how a revised 
empirical account of public communication may entail a revision in normative ideals. For a 
norm to be appropriate it should be logically possible (or coherent) and empirically possible 
to act in accordance with it, at least in principle.3 To do so normative conceptions of public 
communication need to ensure that the empirical premises which they contain—for instance 
about institutions, communication technologies, the nature of human agency and our rea-
soning capacity—are not systematically contradicted by empirical evidence. We should be 
asking not only where empirical research tells us that public communication falls short of 
an ideal, but also what it reveals about the obtainability of these ideals. Absent logical and 
empirical possibility one cannot plausibly argue that ideals of public communication are 
appropriate. 
 
Logical possibility, or getting coherent norms 
Are norms of public communication coherent? For instance, is it coherent to stipulate the 
procedural guideline of maximally inclusive participation, as well as the aim of a correct 
outcome? Though, as noted above, it seems these principles are on collision course (Estlund 
1997; Lippert-Rasmussen 2012). We can turn to social choice theory to begin a rigorous 
assessment of lurking contradictions between different sets of normative conditions. If in-
puts (individual preferences or judgements), for instance, are perfectly rational, is this suf-
ficient for collective choices to be rational? Condorcet’s paradox demonstrates that even if 
                                               
3 There is a lively debate around the question whether ought implies can. I do not take a lack of 
feasibility (due to lack of motivation, ability or institutional constraint) as sufficient to defeat a 
normative ideal, though it should in principle be possible to realise a stipulated set of aims (Estlund 
2011; Southwood 2016; Chahboun 2017). 
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individual preferences are rational, majority preferences can be irrational; that is, non-
transitive (Maclean and Hewitt 1994). The relevance of such results to media and commu-
nication research should be carefully considered, particularly as it has been argued that 
deliberative communication can help overcome weaknesses of preference aggregation (i.e. 
the inherent instability of aggregated majority preferences) (Dryzek and List 2003). Indeed, 
any realistic collective choice will involve formal procedures, such as elections, alongside 
less structured processes of public communication (e.g. news, deliberation, private conver-
sation, or protest). However, though logical possibility may be necessary, it does not in 
itself yield empirical possibility. 
 
Empirical possibility 
Whether the empirical premises contained in normative ideals of public communication are 
accurate, is an important question. For instance, the idea that a diverse news diet is desir-
able, because it increases political knowledge can be investigated—things other than a di-
verse news diet may be more effective to maximize political knowledge. Indeed, political 
knowledge should not be fetishized as a solution to democratic problems (Kaye 2015). Sim-
ilarly, a deliberative democrat may put forward the normative proposition that choice pro-
cesses function as they ought to if they maximize participation (means), maximize correct-
ness or narrow disagreement (ends). This is the normative aim, which contains the empirical 
proposition that certain kinds of communication (e.g. deliberation) are conducive to these 
goals. The latter lends itself to empirical investigation. There is, for example, evidence that 
particular kinds of deliberation increase the probability of transforming preferences (Land-
wehr and Holzinger 2010) and that deliberation online and offline can increase participants’ 
understanding (input) of an issue and their political efficacy (output) (Min 2007). 
Such insights are of particular value because they shed light on the circumstances under 
which normative propositions are empirically obtainable. If empirical results show only weak 
links (effects) between certain kinds of public communication and the stipulated aims, this 
may provide reason for revising normative ideals. In short, it makes sense to ask empirical 
questions that lead to a better understanding of the normative functioning of public com-
munication, while it makes pragmatic sense to stipulate normative standards that are min-
imally demanding but sufficient for the desired aims to obtain. 
 
Practical feasibility, or getting the-world-to-fit-the-norm 
Both normative and empirical thinking on public communication are ultimately concerned 
with practice—and practice is a matter of getting the-world-to-fit-the- norm. Empirical and 
normative approaches can be bridged, in practice, by specifying conditions of enactment—
what Rawls broadly referred to as non-ideal theory’s task of figuring out how we can work 
towards these normative aims. Another approach renews efforts to give free-standing norms 
procedural legs to avoid normative slippage, by differentiating between substantive and 
meta-choices (i.e. choices about procedural norms), and remitting both to collective choice. 
Though this may serve as a practical solution to circumvent the problem of normative slip-
page, it arguably just turns a second-order problem into a third-order one. 
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Conditions of enactment—norms as action guiding 
Well-structured public communication can be thought of as a regulative ideal. It is supposed 
to motivate us to conduct communications in a particular way, to guide our practices of 
public communication. As Mansbridge et al. (2010) remind us, regulative ideals are never 
fully achievable, but are intended as action guiding. The degree to which normative con-
ceptions of public communication are successful in guiding our actions will depend on 
whether they are accompanied by, what Held calls, conditions of enactment: 
“if a theory of the most desirable form of democracy is to be at all plausible, it must be 
concerned with both theoretical and practical issues, with philosophical as well as organiza-
tional and institutional questions. Without this double focus, an arbitrary choice of principles 
and seemingly endless abstract debates about them are encouraged. A consideration of prin-
ciples, without an examination of the conditions for their realization, may preserve a sense of 
virtue, but it will leave the actual meaning of such principles barely spelt out at all.” (2006, 
266) 
Too often questions about the realization of normative aims remain under-specified. If we 
stipulate a limited (e.g. national) domain for public communication, then how can this be 
realized in a situation where ever fewer of our communications are relayed through na-
tional, language specific broadcast media, and ever more are diffused through decidedly 
transnational, multilingual social media? Similarly, if the aim is to maximize political 
knowledge, how can that be achieved when political information is increasingly diffused 
through peer-to-peer networks on the social web, rather than being delivered to the public 
directly by traditional information intermediaries such as newspapers? 
 
Choices and meta-choices 
It is sometimes argued that normative slippage—the need for antecedent standards of ade-
quacy—can be avoided. Michelman (1997) suggests that in practice it is acceptable for nor-
mative standards to be incrementally revised in and through public debate. To conceptual-
ize this, normative standards are conceived as meta-choices or meta-agreements (about the 
conditions that public communication and collective choices should satisfy), and distin-
guished from substantive choices (about substantive matters of the common good) (see Fig-
ure 1; List 2002; Ottonelli and Porello 2012). Meta-choices regard questions about how a 
choice process ought to be structured (e.g. who should participate, etc.). Substantive 
choices regard questions about the content of a choice (e.g. should we build more schools). 
The former informs the conditions of the latter. 
Treating ideals of public communication as meta-choices allows us to consider them ‘in 
progress’ and susceptible to change over time (Steiner 2012). Processes of choice formation 
are open-ended: For Habermas (1987; 1996) deliberative processes are never fully con-
cluded (unabgeschlossen), and norms are fallible, always open to potential revision in the 
future. In fact, collective choice processes, and the public communications that furnish 
collective choice situations with information and relevant arguments, are not causally lin-
ear, structured ex nihilo according to fixed principles, working their way towards a conclu-
sive collective choice. They are non- linear, dynamic, dialectical, and over time capable of 
revising the standards that guide them. Some studies have operationalized the idea of meta-
choices, finding deliberation capable of generating agreement at the meta level (Niemeyer 
and Dryzek 2007; List et al. 2013). If this is the case, an opportunity is on offer to thematize 
the normative goals of democratic procedure in public discourse (e.g. what are the aims of 
journalism), allowing public communication to self-revise its guiding norms. 
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5 Conclusions 
The role of media and communications in politics is as pertinent as ever, as is public com-
munication’s normative task of facilitating collective choices that can reconcile pluralism 
with a shared understanding of the common good. It aims to do so procedurally, in ways 
that avoid substantive normative commitments. Yet, a gap remains between what is and 
what ought to be that often goes unacknowledged. In the study of media and communica-
tions there is often a paucity of analytical continuity between normative ideals and empir-
ical observation. Herein I have begun to anticipate how a procedural account of public com-
munication can yield analytical continuity across the gap that separates ideals and empirical 
data points. I have suggested that normative slippage recognizes the necessary concomi-
tance of is and ought, leaving us with a set of ideals and observations about the same phe-
nomena, that are methodologically and epistemically distinct, but non-rival and non-dual-
istic.  
To remain conceptually fruitful, empirically productive and practically useful, the study of 
media and communications demands this double-focus. It requires clarity about the values 
that frame our research, and the ideals that guide the interpretation of empirical results. 
And it requires us to reflect on the normative implications of these results. On the other 
hand, normative enquiry must not lose sight of the field of empirical results. The normative 
ideals we stipulate for public communication will never hit the road of communicative prac-
tice if they fail to account for the socio- political context within which social agents access 
information, discuss, debate and deliberate, in which journalists and other information in-
termediaries work, and indeed changing communication technologies which enable new 
public communications phenomena (e.g. algorithmic filters, computational propaganda, 
customizable info- spheres, bots, trolls, etc.). We have to live in the world we have, with 
its contradictions, incongruities and divisions, not the world we wish to live in. We should, 
in short, be clear about the values that guide our research on media and communications, 
and we should carefully consider how empirical research informs those values. 
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